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II. THE SOURCES AND BINDING FORCE OF THE
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
A. THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
The great dividing line in the historical development of the law of naval
warfare must be drawn at the outbreak of the first World War in 1914, for
what is generally referred to as the" traditional law" is substantially the
law as it appeared at this date. In the main, the traditional law of naval
warfare is customary in character, developing out of eighteenth and-particularly-nineteenth century practices. The various attempts to codify
this customary law have never enjoyed the same degree of success that have
attended similar efforts with respect to the codification of land warfare.
There is no convention dealing with the regulation of naval hostilities that
compares in scope and importance to the Regulations attached to Hague
Convention IV (1907), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which dealt specifically with the
conduct of naval warfare are few in number and, with the exception of
XIII (1907) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Maritime War, of relatively minor significance .I
Historically, the most important, and certainly the most controversial,
disputes arising in the course of naval hostilities related to the extent and
character of the right of ·belligerents to interfere on the high seas with
private neutral trade. In the Declaration of London of 1909 the attempt
was made to produce a generally acceptable codification of nineteenth century practices in this area of the law. However, the Declaration was never
ratified by any of the signatory states; and despite the occasional claims of
belligerents and neutral states during the first World War that the Declaration of London set forth the valid law regulating belligerent behavior at
sea, it was not binding upon the naval belligerents in either World War. 2
1 The Hague Conventions of 1907 relating to the conduct of naval warfare are: VI Status of
Enemy Merchant Ships At the Outbreak of Hostilities; VII Conversion of Merchant Ships in
Time of War; VIII Laying of Automatic Contact Mines; IX Bombardment by Naval Forces
in Time of War; X Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention;
XI Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Rights of Capture in Naval War; and XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Maritime War._ The United States ratified
Conventions VIII, IX, X and XI. Convention XIII was adhered to by the United States subject
to certain reservations (see pp. 2.18 ff.).-During the nineteenth century the most important
Convention concluded for the regulation of maritime warfare was the Declaration of Pads
(1856). On the present status of the rules making up the Declaration of Paris, see pp. 99-102..
2 For further remarks dealing generally with the Declaration of London, see pp. 187-9·
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In the period of over four decades that has elapsed since the outbreak of
the first World War there has been only one international instrument concluded for the regulation of naval hostilities that has received general adherence, and that instrument is the London Protocol of 1936 requiring submarines to conform in their actions against merchant vessels to the rules of
international law to which surface vessels are subject. 3 To the extent,
then, that the traditional law has been changed, such change has come
principally through the practices of two World Wars. 4
In recent years attention has been increasingly called to the uncertainty
that characterizes a substantial portion of this traditional law of naval warfare. The principal source of this uncertainty undoubtedly stems from the
practices of the two World Wars. Although exaggerated accounts of the
lawless behavior of the major naval belligerents frequently have been given
there is no denying the fact that both wars-and particularly the second
World War-witnessed the widespread violation of the traditional law.
In the period following World War I it seemed plausible to contend that
the circumstances of this conflict were exceptional (which, indeed, they
were as judged by the circumstances of earlier wars), and that the effects of
the war upon the traditional law had to be considered in the light of these
exceptional circumstances. In general, this attitude led to the result that
the traditional law-the law in force at the outbreak of World War I-was
still considered, on the whole, to remain unimpaired.
Thus H. A. Smith has observed that:
After the armistice of 1918 opinion in the Allied countries
tended to regard the experience of the w~.r as something both deplorable and exceptional. It was hoped that the authority of the
old rules could be restored and this view found expression in the
unratified treaty drawn up at the Washington Conference of 192.2.,
which declared in effect that submarines must obey the same rules
as surface ships. Almost all the writers of textbooks assumed
that the rules of 1914 were still in force, and that the departures
from these rules could be attributed to temporary causes not likely
to be repeated. The official manuals issued in many countries for
the instruction of naval officers all assumed the same point of view. 5
The general reaction that has followed in the wake of the second World
War, a war that served largely to confirm and to carry still further the prac3

For the text and commentary upon the present status of the Protocol, see pp. 6310. It may
be noted that the Protocol was very largely a restatement, in conventional form, of pre-existing
rules of customary law applicable to the operation of surface vessels.
• We are neglecting for the present the possible changes effected in the rules governing neutralbelligerent relations that result from obligations states may assume by virtue of membership
in collective security organizations (see pp. I7I-8o).-Afairly detailed account of the historical
development of the law of naval warfare up to World War II is given by Raoul Genet, Droit
Maritime Pour le Temps de Guerre (I936-38), Vol. I, pp. 57-91.
5
H. A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (2.nd. ed., 1950), p. 72..

27

uces initiated a quarter of a century earlier, has been quite different. The
argument that the circumstances of this second conflict were exceptional
appears, for obvious reasons, far less plausible and has been resorted to only
infrequently. H anything, there now seems to be a widespread-though
by no means unanimous-conviction that the experience of World War II
must be considered as the probable standard for the future conduct of war
at sea rather than an exceptional event of the past whose recurrence is unlikely. 6 Occasionally, this more recent reaction has taken the form of expressing the belief that in modern war much of the traditional law is simply
inapplicable given the far-reaching transformation of the nineteenth century environment in which this law developed and from which it derived
its meaning and significance. From this latter point of view it is insufficient to concentrate attention_ only upon the actual practices of the two
World Wars. In addition, an inquiry must be made into the social, political and technological developments that have led to these recent practices.
The experience of the two World Wars is held-according to this view-to
indicate not only the relative ineffectiveness of many of the traditional
rules. Even more important is the allegation that the traditional law no
longer bears a meaningful relationship to the contemporary-and, it is
assumed, the future-environment. Hence, it is this ever widening gap,
this growing tension, between the contemporary social, political and technological environment and the environment presupposed by the traditional
law that will presumably determine the inapplicability of this law in future
hostilities at sea. 7
To a limited degree, the difficulties encountered in the endeavor to assess
6 Among recent expressions to this effect, Julius Stone, op. cit., pp. 402.-q, so8-1o, 595160];
H. A. Smith, The Crisis in the Law of Nations (1947), pp. 33-66; H. Lauterpacht, "The Problem
of the Revision of The Law of War," B. Y. I. L., 2.9 (1952.), pp. 373-7. It is an interesting gloss
on the complexity of the attempt to evaluate the effects of recent practice on the traditional
law that assertions as to the future ineffectiveness of this law are frequently made by writersincluding those cited above-who nevertheless insist upon the continued validity of this law.
7 Thus the argument cited above usually places emphasis upon the fact that the traditional
law developed from, and consequently presupposed for its operation, a certain type of state
and a certain type of war. The conception of the state was not necessarily democratic, but it
was a state with limited powers. It presupposed economic liberalism, with a clear distinction
to be drawn between the activities of the state and the activities of the private individual.
The nineteenth century conception of war was that of a limited war, limited not only in terms
of the number of states involved in any conflict, but also limited in terms of the fraction of
each belligerent's population which either actively participated in or closely identified itself
with the conduct of war. Finally, this conception of war presupposed limited war aims on the
part of belligerents, which in turn facilitated the introduction of effective restraints upon the
methods by which these aims might be pursued. Perhaps the decisive factor in conditioning
the development of the traditional law was the assumption that in any war a substantial number of states would refrain from participating in hostilities, and that the interests of these
non-participants would have to be respected (see pp. 181-4). The conditions under which the
two World Wars were fought, it is contended, have either placed in serious question or have
swept away entirely these nineteenth century conceptions.
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the impact of the two World Wars upon the traditional law may be lessened
once it is recognized that the continued validity of this law is dependent
upon a minimum degree of effectiveness. In a legal system characterized
by a low stage of procedural development-as is the international legal
system-the prolonged and marked ineffectiveness of a once valid rule
would appear to result in rendering this rule no longer binding. 8 In the
case of customary rules-and they form the primary concern here-the
requirement that continued validity must presuppose a minimum degree
of effectiveness would seem almost compelling, for the creation of customary
law depends upon a well-established practice of states that is accompanied
by the general conviction that the practice in question is both obligatory
and right. 9 The effectiveness of the practice which serves to create customary law forms an essential prerequisite. Conversely, the invalidation
of a rule of customary law may be brought about by a sustained and effective practice that is contrary to ·once-established custom, particularly a
practice that has ceased to provoke either protest or reprisal on the part
of interested states. Presumably, the same requirement of effectiveness
may be considered applicable to general rules established by convention;
rules that are neither obeyed nor applied by the parties to a convention
over a substantial period of time may be considered as being no longer valid.
The apparent ease with which the general relationship between the binding quality of the rules of war and the effectiveness of these rules may be
stated should not prove misleading, however. In practice, the difficulties
occur when the descent is made from the general proposition to the concrete
case, and the question is posed: has this rule of customary (or conventional)
law ceased to be valid for the reason that over a defined period of time it
has been ineffective in regulating belligerent behavior? Merely to formulate the problem in this manner suggests the serious obstacles in the way
of a practical and useful solution.
There is, to begin with, no rule of positive international law indicating
either the length of the period or the degree of ineffectiveness sufficient to
invalidate established rules of custom (or convention), just as there is no
rule determining the point at which established usage turns into custom.
And although the development from usage to custom is a decisive one,
since it is only after this development has occurred that we are entitled to
speak of laws of warfare, it is frequently difficult to determine this point
in time. Nor is the absence of precise criteria for the determination of
these questions relieved by the presence of an international tribunal competent to render authoritative and binding judgments in doubtful cases.
In the absence of international tribunals competent to render such decisions
in a manner binding upon states, the latter themselves must so decide, and
8

In this sense, the "procedural development .. of a legal system refers to the process of effective centralization of the judicial, executive and legislative functions.
g See, Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2.Il ·
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the evidence of such decisions will commonly be manifested in the instructions many states issue to their naval forces, in the diplomatic correspondence carried on by states, in the prize codes states enact when engaged in
hostilities, and in the decisions rendered by national prize courts. Yet
these ··decisions,'' insofar as they constitute an interpretation of the law
of naval warfare, are not binding upon other states; the right of each
state to interpret the law is not a right to decide this law in the sense that
this interpretation is obligatory for other states. 10
It is quite true that the absence of compulsory international tribunals
affects the utility of conventional rules as well, since not infrequently the
provisions of conventional rules are subject to widely varying interpretations.11 Nevertheless, in the case of customary rules this difficulty is
normally magnified, since the degree of uncertainty as to the content of a
customary rule is not only likely to be greater, but the very existence of the
rule is in many instances the real subject of dispute. In the history of
naval warfare controversies over the meaning or even the purported existence of customary rules have never been absent, and this uncertainty has
had as a consequence the furnishing of belligerents with a convenient pretext for the taking of reprisals against allegedly unlawful behavior of an
enemy.
In short, the obvious consequences of the far-reaching decentralization
characteristic of the international legal order are perhaps even more readily
apparent in time of war than in time of peace, and the uncertainty produced
by this condition is more clearly evident in the case of customary rules than
in the case of conventional rules. Hence, even if it is generally admitted
that a necessary relationship must exist between the validity and the
effectiveness of the rules regulating the conduct of war at sea, the above
considerations would appear to indicate that in practice a large number of
these rules must continue to lead what might be termed a ·"shadowy
existence.''
There is a further, and closely related, factor that contributes to the
difficulty of rendering a satisfactory evaluation of the impact of recent
practices upon the traditional law. During both World Wars the major
10 "The technical organizational insufficiency of international law may, and in fact does,
make it difficult to determine whether a state acts in accordance with, or contrary to, international law. . . . It is generally recognized that the root of the unsatisfactory situation in international law and relations is the absence of an authority generally_ competent
to declare what the law is at any given time, how it applies to a given situation or dispute,
and what the appropriate sanction may be. In the absence of such an authority, and failing
agreement between the states at variance on these points, each state has a right to interpret
the law, the right of auto-interpretation, as it might be called. This interpretation, however,
is not a 'decision' and is neither final nor binding upon the other parties." Leo Gross, "'States
as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Auto-Interpretation," Law and Politics in
tho World Community, pp. 76-7.
.
11 An example of such widely varying interpretations may be seen in the case of the provisions
of Hague VIII (1907), dealing with the laying of automatic contact mines. See pp. 303-5·
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naval belligerents deemed it necessary to conduct hostilities at sea largely
upon the basis of measures whose legal justification-if the continued
validity of the traditional law is assumed-could rest only upon the belligerent right of reprisal. The declaration of operational (war) zone
within which neutral shipping was subject to special hazards, the indiscriminate laying of mines, the resort to unrestricted aerial and submarine
vvarfare, the substantial alteration of the traditional law governing blockade and contraband-these and other measures were based for the most
part upon the belligerent claim of reprisal. There is no need, at this point,
to consider the nature and permissible extent of the belligerent dght to
resort to reprisals in maritime warfare, particularly when belligerent
reprisals are found to operate principally against neutral shipping. 12 Nor
is it necessary to examine in this connection the controversial question of
ultimate responsibility for the initiation of the seemingly endless series of
reprisals at sea. It is relevant to observe, however, that the resort to
reprisals in both World Wars provided-in certain instances at least-a
convenient method for evading the restrictions imposed by the traditional
law, and, it has been contended, for effecting changes in this law that ordinarily would have been left to the explicit agreement of the interested
states. 13
At the same time, the care with which belligerents have frequently
sought to base departures from the traditional law upon the right of reprisal against allegedly unlawful actions of an enemy 14 has had the result
of denying the possibility of rendering an unambiguous interpretation of the
measures which formed the content of these reprisals. Normally, the
resort to reprisals may be interpreted as an affirmation of the continued
validity of the law the violation of which forms the condition of the reprisal. A reprisal between belligerents is an act, otherwise unlawful, that
is exceptionally permitted to a belligerent as a reaction against a previous
violation of law by an enemy. 15 Despite the evident desire of belligerents
12

See pp. l87-9o, 2.53-8.
"In the sphere of maritime law the operation of reprisals in both World Wars has, in
practice, replaced most of the traditional rules. In a sense, reprisals have often fulfilled the
function which would normally have been left to the agreement between States, namely, that
of the adaptation of the law to the changed conditions of modern warfare. For this reason it
is not always profitable to inquire whose original illegality opened wide the flood gates of
retaliation. It is sufficient to note that the torrent swept away with devastating thoroughness
many of the elaborate, though often controversial, rules." H. Lauterpacht, "The Law of
Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," B. Y. I. L., 2.1 (1944), p. 76. See also the penetrating comments of Julius Stone (op. cit., pp. 355-66, 366-7) on the "legislative function"
of reprisals in naval warfare.
14 A care which Nazi Germany did not abandon even at the height of her wartime victories.
Thus the German "blockade" announcement of August 18, 1940, sought to justify the measures
to be taken against enemy and neutral vessels upon the right of retaliation.
For text of the
German "blockade" announcement, see U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents,
I94o, pp. 46-5o. Also, see pp. 2.96-305.
1
5 On reprisals generally, see pp. 150-3.
13
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in recent maritime warfare to use reprisals as a pretext for evading the traditional law, there is nevertheless considerable merit in the argument that
the very care with vv-hich such departures were usually justified as reprisals
indicates the continued existence of a conviction that behavior in conformity with this law is normally both obligatory and right. It has already
been observed that this conviction is a necessary element-along with the
criterion of effectiveness-in the creation of customary law. It would appear equally true that the retention of this conviction must be taken into
consideration when attempting to determine the continued validity of the
traditional law. This consideration, therefore, must form a qualification upon an uncritical use of the principle of effectiveness.
There are, of course, limits to the significance that reasonably can be
given to the claim of reprisals. This is especially so when acts resorted to
as reprisals threaten to become part of the permanent structure of naval
hostilities rather than a temporary and limited exception. Still, the fact
that belligerents have felt the necessity to use the plea of reprisals when
departing from the traditional law warrants the most careful inquiry before
a rule of maritime warfare can be considered, with assurance, as no longer
valid. 16

B. THE BINDING FORCE OF THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
As a general rule, the binding force of conventional rules of war is limited
to the contracting parties, and then only to the extent specified by the
terms of the convention in question and by the conditions accompanying
ratification or adherence. 17 On the other hand, the customary rules of the
law of war are binding upon all states and under all circumstances. The
16

The remarks made in the text above on the relationship between the validity and the
effectiveness of the laws of war form a problem upon which succeeding chapters provide almost
a continuous commentary. Indeed, it is surely no exaggeration to state that the effect of recent
practice upon the traditional law constitutes the critical problem in any contemporary inquiry
into the present status of the rules of naval warfare. Unfortunately, however, it is next to
impossible to present a clear and satisfactory answer to this problem, largely for those reasons
that have already been indicated in the preceding pages of this chapter.
17 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2.13b and notes thereto. All of the Hague Conventions
of 1907 contain a provision known as the "general participation" clause, to the effect that the
convention in question applies only to the contracting parties, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention. In strict law, therefore, these conventions are not binding
unless the requirements of the general participation clause are met. During World Wars I and
II some of these conventions were nevertheless"applied, despite the fact that not all the belligerents were parties to the convention in question. In practice, s~ates have looked more to
the element of reciprocity than to the formal standards of this clause. In addition, some.of
the 1907 Hague Conventions have come to be considered as a codification of customary law,
hence binding upon all belligerents irrespective of ratification or adherence-e. g., Hague
IV, Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land. More recently, the contracting
parties to multilateral conventions regulating the conduct of war have avoided the "general
participation" clause. The common Article 2. paragraph 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
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statement is frequently made that reprisals form one clear exception to the
binding force of customary rules. 18 However, this manner of formulation
rna y easily prove misleading. The act of taking reprisals does not represent a restriction to the binding force of customary law. On the contrary,
this law remains fully binding, and the act of taking reprisals is itself a
clear indication of the continued binding force of the customary law the
violation of which forms the condition for the act of reprisal. Reprisals
do not represent-at least not in theory 19-an abandonment of the customary law (or the conventional law for that matter), but rather the enforcement of that law; at the very least, reprisals represent an act of·· self help"
permitted against a previous violation of law. 20
Apart from reprisals, the principle of military necessity has generally
been considered as the most important qualification to the binding force
of both the customary and conventional law of war. Indeed, the extent
to which this principle may be held to restrict the operation of the rules
of war has provided one of the most disputed issues among writers. 21
The core of the controversy has centered about the doctrine that interprets
military necessity as serving to justify departure from any of the established
rules of war when the observance of these rules either would endanger the
on the Protection of Victims of War provides that the contracting Parties to the conventionsin time of conflict-remain bound by the conventions, as among themselves, even though
one of the belligerents is not so bound. Thus: ••Although one of the Powers in conflict may
not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are Parties thereto shall remain
bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention
in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.''
18 Thus Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit,. p. 2.31): "As soon as usages of warfare have by
custom or treaty evolved into laws of war, they are binding upon belligerents under all circumstances and conditions, except in the case of reprisals as retaliation against a belligerent for
illegitimate acts of warfare by the members of his armed forces or his other subjects."
19 A different question, of course, concerns the practical effect of reprisals, particularly as
operative in hostilities at sea.
20 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2IJa.
21 It should be made clear that in this context the principle of military necessity is considered
as a rule of positive law and not as an ideal (or policy) influential in the development of the
law of war. However, as a rule of positive law the principle of military necessity has been
used in two quite different senses, which should be distinguished clearly. In the first sense,
military necessity is held to constitute a restriction-whether explicit or implicit-upon the
operation of the positive rules of custom and convention. Here military necessity refers to
those exceptional conditions or circumstances in which behavior otherwise prescribed by established rules of law may be disregarded. In the second sense, the principle of military necessity forms a standard (along with the principle of humanity) for determining the legality
of a weapon or method of warfare not already expressly regulated by a rule of custom or convention. In the former sense, then, military necessity relates to restrictions upon the operation
of existing rules; in the latter sense military necessity provides a standard for judging the legality
of weapons and methods not already expressly regulated. It is the first meaning of the principle
that is considered here, whereas the latter meaning is considered when dealing with the general
principles governing the weapons and methods of warfare (see pp. 45-50). Article 2.2.oa of the
Law of Naval Warfare includes both meanings within its definition of military necessity.
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success of a military operation or would threaten the survival (self-preservation) of a military unit. 22 In either circumstance, the principle of military necessity is considered to be operative and to free belligerents from
behaving in accordance with otherwise valid law. 23
As against this interpretation of military necessity it has been argued,
principally by English and American writers, that military necessitymore precisely, that the circumstances held to constitute a condition of
military necessity-can justify a departure from behavior normally demanded by the law of war only when conventional or customary rules
expressly provide for the exceptional operation of military necessity. 24
According to this latter interpretation-which is believed to be correctmilitary necessity must be interpreted "to denote those exceptional circumstances of practical necessity contemplated by express reservations to
be found in several Articles of the Hague Regulations and other Conventions in regard to acts otherwise prohibited. The general principle is that
conventional and customary rules of warfare are always binding upon
belligerents and cannot be disregarded even in case of military necessity.'· 25
22

In its classic form this doctrine is usually identified with the German proverb-kriegsThe proverb is
~omewhat misleading since it has not been used primarily to refer to the manner or usages of
war (kriegsmanier)-which would raise no serious question-but rather to the established Taw
of war (kreigsrecht)-which does raise a serious question. This is clear from the formulation of
kriegsraison given by Leuder (quoted in The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law (1914), pp. 2.44-5) to the following effect: "Kriegsraison embraces those cases in
which, by way of exception, the law of war ought to be left without observance. . . . When
. .. the circumstances are such that the attainment of the object of the war and the escape
from extreme danger would be hindered by observing the limitations imposed by the laws ot
war, and can only be accomplished by breaking through these limitations, the latter is what
ought to happen.··
23 Strictly speaking, this particular interpretation of military necessity does not deny the
general validity of the customary and conventional law of war. Hence, military necessity is
not used to deny the binding force (validity), in the formal sense, of these rules, though this
may well be the practical effect of the doctrine. It is asserted, however, that this principle
must be held to constitute an implied restriction to, and therefore can in the appropriate circumstances override, any otherwise valid rule of warfare.
24 Examples of conventional rules providing for the exceptional operation of military necessity
are: in land warfare, Article 2.3g of the Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV (1907)
forbidding belligerents to "destroy or seize the enemy"s property, unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war··; in naval warfare, Article 16 of
Hague Convention X (1907) requiring that "after every engagement the two belligerents, so
far as military interests permit, shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick and wounded,
and to protect them, as well as the dead, against pillage and ill treatment'' (Article 18 of the
1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of \Vounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea substantially repeats this earlier provision, save
that it uses the words "take all possible measures to search for"').
25 N.C. H. Dunbar, "Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials,'" B. Y. I. L., 2.9 (1952.), p. 444·
To the same effect, W. G. Downey, Jr. ("The Law of War and Military Necessity," A.]. 1.-L.,
47 (1953), p. 2.62.): " . . . military necessity cannot justify an act by a military commander
which disregards a positive rule of law or which goes beyond the express limitations of a
raison geht vor kriegsmanier-necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare.

34

Hence, the principle of military necessity cannot be considered as superior
to, and thereby restricting the operation of, all other rules of warfare,
whether customary or conventional. On the contrary, it is the principle
of military necessity that may be restricted by the positive law of war, and
occasionally is so restricted. 26 Not everything necessary to the purpose of
war is allowed by the law of war. 27
qualified rule of law. Such acts always constitute a violation of the law of war." OppenheimLauterpacht (op. cit., p. 2.32.): "These conventions and customary rules cannot be overruled
by necessity, unless they are framed in such a way as not to apply to a case of necessity in selfpreservation." Also Erik Castren (The Present Law of War and Neutrality, (1954), p. 66): "This
view (i. e., doctrine of kriegsraison) of the elasticity of the laws of war must be absolutely
rejected as it cannot be legally justified and as its practical consequences are most dangerous."
Section 2.2.oa of the Law of Naval Warfare speaks of the operation of military necessity when
"not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war." (And see notes to this provision for further
elaboration.)
26 It has been pointed out by many writers that one reason why military necessity may not
be invoked except when expressly provided for by rules of warfare is that in establishing these
rules military necessity has already been taken into consideration. This is held to be particularly
true of conventional rules. (And the preamble to Hague Convention IV (1907), fl,1rnishes some
support for this opinion in declaring that: "according to the views of the High Contracting
Parties, these provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish
the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit. . . . ") 'While this contention is
justified in large measure, it is important to recognize, at the same time, that certain rules
clearly do not allow for the operation of military necessity. Thus the prohibitions against
killing prisoners of war-or helpless survivors at sea-are absolute, and circumstances of
military necessity do not justify any departures from these prohibitions. To a certain extent,
therefore, it is a fiction to maintain that the law of war has in each instance already taken into
account the requirements of military necessity, since in some instances action is prohibited
even though circumstances constituting military necessity may otherwise require the performance of the prohibited action. Article r common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions states
that: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances." [italics added] Finally, for an earlier-and emphaticstatement in the German literature to the effect that military necessity can be invoked only
in the case of norms specifically providing for the exceptional operation of military necessity,
see J. L. Kunz, K.riegsrecht und Neutralittitsrecht (1935), pp. 2.6-8.
27 With respect to this more restrictive interpretation of military necessity it has been recently
stated that: "This reasoning . . . would forbid departure from the rules of war-law even in
face of the direst needs of survival. Yet it remains ground common to British, American, French,
Italian and other publicists, as well as German, that a State is privileged, in title of self-preservation, to violate its ordinary duties under international law, even towards States with which
it is at peace; and may also itself determine when its self-preservation is involved. Neither
practice nor the literature explain satisfactorily how the privilege based on self-preservation
in times of peace can be denied to States at war." Stone, op. cit., pp. 352.-3. Although the
principle of military necessity more commonly refers "to the plight in which armed forces
may find themselves under stress of active warfare" and not to "a danger or emergency of such
proportions as to threaten immediately the vital interests, and, perhaps, the very existence of
the state itself" (Dunbar, op. cit., p. 443), it is nevertheless true that departures from the law
of war can be-and frequently have been-justified in terms of the states' "fundamental right"
of self-preservation. To this extent Professor Stone is certainly correct in observing a contradiction between the latitude ascribed by writers to the states' "right of self-preservation" in
time of peace and a denial of the same right in time of war. In fact, however, the criticism
399334-57--4

35

It is this latter, and more restrictive, interpretation of military necessity
that has recently received clear judicial endorsement. In the war crimes
trials following the second World War the chief preoccupation of tribunals
called upon to interpret the principle of military necessity was to determine
when circumstances of military necessity could be considered as serving to
justify departures from conduct normally prescribed by the rules of warfare.
Although the judgments of tribunals were by no means identical on a number of points, there nevertheless was a remarkable uniformity of judicial
opinion, which-taken as a whole-clearly appears to support the narrow
interpretation of military necessity. The following is a brief summary of
these judgments.
(1) Military necessity may serve as a defense plea against charges of
committing acts normally forbidden by the law of war only when the rule
in question can be interpreted as permitting such exceptional departure in
circumstances constituting a condition of military necessity. Thus in the
Hostages Trial the tribunal stated that the prohibitions contained in the
Hague Regulations "are superior to military necessities of the most urgent
nature except where the Regulations themselves specifically provide the
contrary. . . . " 28 In the case of conventional law the rule in question
1nurt provide expressly for military necessity. In particular, where the prohibition contained in a rule is absolute in character, military necessity
cannot be used as a defense. Thus circumstances of military necessity have
not been considered as justifying the killing of prisoners of war. 29
Professor Stone properly raises points to the necessity of a "frank review of the meaning of
the self-preservation" doctrine as it applies in time of peace. The right of self-preservation
accorded to a state in time of peace must therefore be limited to a right of action against measures which are prima facie unlawful. Neither "necessity in self-preservation" in time of peace
nor "military necessity" in time of war can be held to justify a departure from established law,
if such departure is taken in response to acts admittedly lawful in character.
28 (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others), Law Reports . .. , 8 (1949), p. 69.
Elsewhere the Tribunal
went so far as to state that "the rules of International Law must be followed even if it results
in the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant their violation"
(p. 67). In the Krupp Trial the tribunal declared that: ''It is an essence of war that one or the
other side must lose and the experienced generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted
the rules and customs of land warfare. In short these rules and customs of warfare are designed
specifically for all phases of war." (Trial of Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
and Eleven Others), Law Reports . .. , ro (1949), p. 139· Also see the Trial of Erhard Milch,
Law Reports . . ·J 7 (1948), pp. 44, 64-5.
In his excellent survey of these and other cases, Dunbar (op. cit., p. 452.) states that: ·-It seems
likely that courts will be disinclined to enlarge the doctrine of military necessity beyond that
countenanced by express reservations appearing in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The
general principle is that belligerents must always respect and observe customary and conventional rules of warfare."
29 In the Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steimrt (Law Reports . . . , 3 (r948), pp. 56-9) a
United States Military Commission tried and sentenced the accused to death by hanging for
unlawfully ordering and killing prisoners of war. At the time the offense was committed the
accused were "part of a German unit which was cJosely surrounded by United States troops,
from which the Germans were hiding.
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(2.) In the case of rules allowing for the exceptional operation of
military necessity, departure from normally prescribed behavior is justified
for reasons of self-preservation or for insuring the success of a military
operation. In addition, there must be an clement of urgency involved that
allowed-or seemed to allow-no alternative course of action. However,
it does not appear that it is essential to establish that the circumstances
constituting a condition of military necessity were objectively present in a
given situation. It is sufficient only to establish that the individual putting
forth the plea of military necessity as a defense honestly believed at the
time that such circumstances were present. 30
30

This last point was given special emphasis in the Hostages Trial where one of the accused
had been charged with the wanton destruction of property while retreating before Russian
forces. The accused maintained that he acted only under circumstances he believed to constitute a condition of military necessity, and that his behavior was justified by Article 2.3g of
Hague IV (1907). In its judgment, the Tribunal stated: "There is evidence in the record
that there was no military necessity for this destruction and devastation. An examination of
the facts in retrospect can well sustain this conclusion. But we are obliged to judge the situation as it appeared to the defendant at the time. If the facts were such as would justify the
action by the exercise of judgment, after giving consideration to all the factors and existing
possibilities, even though the conclusion reached may have been faulty, it cannot be said to
be criminal." (Trial of Wilhelm List ana Others) Law Reports . .. , 8 (1949), pp. 68-9. A
substantially similar-conclusion was reached by the Tribunal in the German High Command
Trial (Trials of Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others) Law Reports . . . , 12. (1949), pp. 93-4.
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